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Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019)
Alizabeth A. Bronsdon
The Supreme Court overruled a 34-year-old precedent and
sparked a sharp dissent by holding that a landowner impacted by a local
ordinance requiring public access to an unofficial cemetery on her
property could bring a takings claim directly in federal court. The decision
eliminated a Catch-22 state-litigation requirement that effectively barred
local takings plaintiffs from federal court, but raised concerns about
government land use and regulation, judicial federalism, and the role of
stare decisis.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Knick v. Township of Scott, the Court held that a government
violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment1 when it takes
property without just compensation, and a property owner may bring a
civil action for the deprivation of their constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C
§ 1983 at that time.2 The holding overturned Williamson County Regional
Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, which required a
property owner to seek just compensation under state law in state court
before bringing a federal takings claim under § 1983.3 The Court stated
that Williamson County’s reasoning was poor and conflicted with prior
takings jurisprudence.4 Additionally, the Court found the state-litigation
requirement unworkable in light of San Remo Hotel, L. P. v. City and
County of San Francisco, which provided preclusive effect to state court
resolutions of takings claims.5
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner Rose Mary Knick owned 90 acres of land in Scott
Township, Pennsylvania (the “Township”), which she used primarily for
grazing horses and other farm animals.6 Knick’s property included a small
family cemetery where the ancestors of Knick’s neighbors were reportedly
buried.7 In December 2012, the Township passed an ordinance requiring
1.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2.
139 S. Ct. 2162, 2168 (2019). See 42 U.S.C § 1983 (2012) (“Every
person who . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . ”).
3.
Id. at 2167. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v.
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
4.
Id.
5.
Id. at 2169 (citing San Remo Hotel, L. P. v. City and County of San
Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005)).
6.
Id. at 2168.
7.
Id.
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that “[a]ll cemeteries . . . be kept open and accessible to the general public
during daylight hours,” even if located on private property.8
In 2013, the Township notified Knick that she was violating the
ordinance.9 Knick sought declaratory and injunctive relief in state court,
arguing the ordinance constituted a taking of her property.10 The Township
withdrew its violation notice and stayed enforcement of the ordinance
during the state court proceedings.11 Consequently, the state court declined
to rule on Knick’s request for relief because she could not demonstrate the
required irreparable harm.12
Knick then filed suit in United States District Court, which
dismissed her takings claim because she had not pursued an inverse
condemnation action in state court as required by Williamson County.13
The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, though it noted the
Township’s ordinance was “extraordinary and constitutionally suspect.”14
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to “reconsider the holding of
Williamson County.”15
III. ANALYSIS
In assessing the validity of Williamson County, the Court first
analyzed its interpretation of the Takings Clause before discussing the
state litigation requirement.16 Finally, the Court addressed the doctrine of
stare decisis and whether an overruling was warranted.17
A. Fifth Amendment Takings
The Court compared the Takings Clause to other constitutional
protections and determined that Williamson County had gone astray as it
created a different, more burdensome route for a takings plaintiff to reach
federal court.18 In Williamson County, the Court held that a developer’s
federal takings claim was “premature” because he had not first sought
compensation through state inverse condemnation procedures.19 The
Court identified two distinct elements of a Takings Clause violation. First,
the government must take the property, and second, it must deny the

8.
Id.
9.
Id.
10.
Id.
11.
Id.
12.
Id.
13.
Id. at 2169 (citing Knick v. Scott Twp., NO. 3:14-CV-02223, 2016
U.S. Dist. Lexis 121220, 2016 WL 4701549, at *5–6 (M.D. Pa., Sept. 8, 2016)).
14.
Id. (citing Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 862 F. 3d 310, 314 (2017)).
15.
Id.
16.
Id. at 2170.
17.
Id. at 2177.
18.
Id.
19.
Id. at 2174 (citing Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v.
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 197 (1985)).
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property owner just compensation.20 As a rule, the Williamson County
Court reasoned that “if a state provides an adequate procedure for seeking
just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the
[Takings] Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied just
compensation.”21 However, if there was no such procedure, the Fifth
Amendment right to compensation would attach immediately.22
Notably, Williamson County relied on Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
Co., which did not involve a takings claim for just compensation.23
Instead, the plaintiff in Monsanto sought injunctive relief under a federal
statute because it effected a taking, even though the statute included a
special arbitration procedure for obtaining compensation.24 The Monsanto
Court concluded that if the plaintiff obtained compensation in arbitration,
there was no taking and thus no claim against the Government.25
The Knick Court rejected this reasoning, noting that the fullycompensated plaintiff’s claim would be moot because “the taking ha[d]
been remedied by compensation, not because there was no taking in the
first place.”26 The Court illustrated Williamson County’s flawed reasoning
with an analogy: “A bank robber might give the loot back, but he still
robbed the bank.”27 Accordingly, providing procedures to remedy a taking
does not negate the fact a taking initially occurred.28
The Court then noted prior takings jurisprudence, which
established that a Fifth Amendment violation occurs at the time of the
taking.29 In Jacobs v. United States,30 the Court held that a property
owner’s claim for compensation “rested upon the Fifth Amendment,” and
“the availability of any particular compensation remedy cannot infringe or
restrict the property owner’s federal constitutional claim—just as the
existence of a state action for battery does not bar a Fourth Amendment
claim of excessive force.”31 Subsequently, First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles32 reaffirmed that
compensation under the Takings Clause is a remedy for the constitutional
violation that “the landowner has already suffered” at the time of the
uncompensated taking.33

20.
Id. at 2181.
21.
Id. at 2171.
22.
Id.
23.
Id. at 2173.
24.
Id. (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1018 (1984)).
25.
Id. at 2173 (citing Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1018 n.21).
26.
Id.
27.
Id. at 2172.
28.
Id.
29.
Id. at 2177–78.
30.
290 U.S. 13 (1933).
31.
Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2171 (citing Jacobs, 290 U.S. at 17).
32.
482 U.S. 304 (1987).
33.
Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2172; First English, 482 U. S. at 315 (citing San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U. S. 621, 654 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
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In addition to established precedent, the Court referenced the plain
text of the Takings Clause, which states that private property shall not be
“taken for public use, without just compensation,”34 as opposed to “taken
for public use, without an available procedure that will result in
compensation.”35 Therefore, if a government takes private property
without just compensation, that government has violated the selfexecuting Fifth Amendment, regardless of subsequent state court
proceedings.36 Because the property owner’s constitutional right vested at
the time of the taking, the Court concluded that the property owner could
proceed directly to federal court under § 1983 at that time.37 The Court
stated that such a scheme demonstrated “fidelity to the Takings Clause”
and “restor[ed] takings claims to the full-fledged constitutional status the
Framers envisioned when they included the Clause among the other
protections in the Bill of Rights.”38
B. State-litigation Requirement
In addition to its interpretation of the Takings Clause, the Court
found Williamson County’s state-litigation requirement “exceptionally ill
founded,”39 and “a rule in search of a justification.”40 The Court
determined the rule’s “shaky foundations” were to blame for its
unanticipated result, which it deemed “unworkable in practice.”41
The “unanticipated consequences” of Williamson County were not
made clear until 20 years later in San Remo.42 There, a takings plaintiff
who was unsuccessful in state court attempted to bring a federal Fifth
Amendment claim for compensation.43 The San Remo Court held,
however, that the full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, required
the federal court to give preclusive effect to the state court’s decision, thus
preventing the plaintiff’s claim.44
The combined result of San Remo and Williamson County
effectively barred local takings plaintiffs from federal court.45 The statelitigation requirement created a trap for takings plaintiffs, and “hand[ed]
authority over federal takings claims to state courts.”46 Thus, under
Williamson County, the adverse state court decision both “gave rise to a
34.
Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V).
35.
Id.
36.
Id.
37.
Id. at 2171.
38.
Id. at 2170.
39.
Id. at 2178.
40.
Id.
41.
Id.
42.
Id. at 2169. See San Remo Hotel, L. P. v. City and County of San
Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005).
43.
San Remo, 545 U.S. at 326.
44.
Id. at 347.
45.
Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2174.
46.
Id. at 2170 (citing San Remo, 545 U.S. at 350 (Rehnquist, C. J.,
concurring)).
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ripe federal takings claim” and “simultaneously barred that claim,
preventing the federal court from ever considering it.”47
C. Stare Decisis
Finally, the Court discussed whether it should overrule
Williamson County, or adhere to the settled law, despite its error, under the
doctrine of stare decisis.48
The Court noted that stare decisis “reflects a judgment that in most
matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than
it be settled right.”49 When overruling a past decision, the Court identified
several factors for consideration: (1) the quality of its reasoning; (2) the
workability of the rule it established; (3) its consistency with other related
decisions; and (4) reliance on the decision.50
Williamson County fell short in all respects. The Court found its
reasoning “exceptionally ill founded” and the subject of repeated criticism
over the years.51 In particular, it concluded that the state-litigation
requirement undermined the force of stare decisis because its justification
continued to evolve.52 Starting as an element of a takings claim, the
requirement morphed into a “prudential” ripeness rule and subsequently
into a new § 1983-specific theory argued by the respondents in Knick.53
Moreover, the requirement proved unworkable after San Remo and
ignored Jacobs and other subsequent decisions, which held that a property
owner’s right to compensation vested at the time of a taking.54 Lastly, the
Court determined there were no reliance interests of concern and rejected
the argument that overruling Williamson County’s state-litigation
requirement will expose governments or agencies to new liability.55
Instead, the holding would “simply allow into federal court takings claims
that otherwise would have been brought as inverse condemnation suits in
state court.”56
IV. DISSENT
A sharp dissent rejected the Court’s textual interpretation, use of
precedent, and analogies. Justice Kagan, joined by three other justices,
argued the Takings Clause was “unique among the Bill of Rights’
47.
Id. at 2169.
48.
Id. at 2177. See Stare Decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019) (“[A] doctrine of precedent, under which a court must follow earlier judicial
decisions when the same points arise again in litigation”).
49.
Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2177.
50.
Id. at 2178 (citing Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., and Mun.
Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478 (2018)).
51.
Id.
52.
Id. at 2178.
53.
Id.
54.
Id.
55.
Id.
56.
Id. at 2179.
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guarantees.”57 Unlike the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees
protection against excessive force, the Takings Clause does not prohibit
takings—only takings without just compensation.58 This distinction, the
dissent wrote, is “an integral attribute of sovereignty.”59
The dissent warned that the majority’s decision “betray[ed]
judicial federalism,” as it will make “complex state-law issues part of the
daily diet of federal district courts.”60 Wide variations among state laws
can complicate the ultimate question of whether a land-use regulation
violates the Takings Clause.61 Courts must first decide whether the
plaintiff had a valid property interest under state law.62 According to the
dissent, that question can be “nuanced and complicated,” and is unfamiliar
to federal courts.63
Finally, the dissent stated that under the guise of overruling a
single case, the Court “smashe[d] a hundred-plus years of legal rulings to
smithereens.”64 The dissent stressed the value of stare decisis and the longestablished preference for relying on Congress to correct conflicting
decisions.65 For example, Congress could fix the San Remo preclusion trap
with legislation allowing property owners to litigate in federal court should
their case fail after a state court proceeding.66 Overturning precedent, the
dissent wrote, “demands a special justification—over and above the belief
that the precedent was wrongly decided,” and “the majority offers no
reason that qualifies.”67
V. CONCLUSION
The Court’s decision in Knick highlighted the complicated
intersection of a property owner’s constitutional rights and the right of a
sovereign local government to impose land use regulations. In finding that
a federal takings claim is ripe at the time of the taking, and overturning
Williamson County’s state-litigation requirement, Knick will make it
easier for local takings plaintiffs to reach the federal courts. However, as
the dissent noted, questions remain regarding how that procedural change
will affect local, state, and federal land use regulations going forward, and
to what extent the Court must justify its departure from stare decisis.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 2181.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2189.
Id. at 2188.
Id.
Id. at 2187.
Id. at 2183.
Id. at 2189.
Id.
Id.

